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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of alternative unionization structures on ﬁrms’ in-
centives to spend on cost-reducing R&D activities as well as to form a Research Joint
Venture, in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that, in contrast to the “hold up”
argument, if ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are
higher when an industry-wide union sets a uniform wage rate than under ﬁrm-level unions.
In contrast, investments are always higher under ﬁrm-level unions in the case of RJVs.
Firms’ incentives to form an RJV are non-monotonic in the degree of centralization of the
wage-setting, with the incentives being stronger under an industry-wide union if and only
if spillovers are low enough. Finally, centralized wage-setting as well as high unemployment
beneﬁts may hinder the formation of costly RJVs and their potential welfare beneﬁts.
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It is well-established that labor market features, such as the level,1 the agenda and the pattern
of employers-employees negotiations, the bargaining power distribution between ﬁrms and
unions, and the labor market institutions (minimum wages, unemployment beneﬁt s ,e t c . ) ,a r e
amongst the crucial determinants of ﬁrms’ innovation activities (see e.g. Hirsch 2004).
In his seminal paper, Grout (1984) ﬁrstly introduced the “hold-up” argument in the litera-
ture. In a “one ﬁrm-one union” framework, Grout argues that in the absence of legally binding
contracts, once the ﬁrm has incurred the sunk costs of investment, its union has incentives
to extract a portion of the quasi-rents created by the ﬁrm’s investment through higher wage
demands. The union’s hold-up behavior, in turn, leads the ﬁrm to underinvest. The higher
t h eu n i o n ’ sp o w e ri s ,t h el o w e ra r et h eﬁrm’s incentives to innovate. However, unionization is
not always associated with underinvestment. In a patent race for a labor savings innovation,
Tauman and Weiss (1987) show that a unionized duopolist has stronger incentives to adopt the
new technology than its non-unionized counterpart. Ulph and Ulph (1994, 1998), in a duopoly
where ﬁrms bargain with their ﬁrm-level unions over employment and wages (“Eﬃcient Bar-
gaining”), show that a more powerful risk-averse union may encourage its ﬁrm to overinvest
in order to win the patent race for a cost-reducing innovation. More recently, Calabuig and
Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) show that if the market size is small, an industry-wide union pro-
vides stronger incentives for a ﬁrm to win a patent race than a ﬁrm-level union. Moreover,
Haucap and Wey (2004) show that innovation incentives are not monotonic in the degree of
centralization of wage-setting. Innovation incentives are the strongest when an industry-wide
union sets a uniform wage rate, they are the weakest under an industry-wide union coordi-
nating, via wage discrimination, its wage demands, while they lie in-between under perfectly
decentralized ﬁrm-level union wage setting. Finally, these theoretical ﬁndings are, to a major
1Contemporary labor market institutions display substantial variability regarding the level of wage negotia-
tions. In USA, Canada and Japan, collective and/or individual bargaining over wages occurs at the ﬁrm-level
alone. In Europe, however, wage negotiations are often conducted at various levels. They are typically central-
ized at the sector-level in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, France and Portugal, while they are centralized at both
the national and the sector-level in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, collective bargaining
over wages is carried out at all three levels (national-, sector-, and ﬁrm-level) in Belgium and Greece. On the
other hand, wage negotiations are mainly decentralized, at the ﬁrm-level, in UK and Ireland (see e.g. Flanagan,
1999; Hartog and Theeuwes, 1992).
1extent, supported by the inconclusive empirical evidence on the impact of the unionization on
the ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003), surveying the bulk
of the empirical literature, conclude that, although there are consistently strong and negative
impacts of unions on R&D expenditures in North America, this is not the case for Europe
where no such clear pattern can be reached. In addition, Hirsch (2004) concludes that the
existing empirical evidence does not allow us to establish, or reject, causal union eﬀects on
R&D investments.
Although the impact of labor market features on ﬁrms’ R&D investments have been exten-
sively addressed in the literature, some key features regarding the nature and the organization
of R&D activities, along with their interplay with the labor market features, have been ignored
so far. Firstly, the spillover eﬀects of a ﬁrm’s R&D activities that may cause underinvestment
problems.2 And secondly, the organizational mode of R&D investments, i.e. whether ﬁrms
invest non-cooperatively, or cooperatively by forming a Research Joint Venture (RJV). As
Vonortas (1997) notes, RJVs are regarded as “the cure for a number of failures in innovation
markets” as far as spillovers are internalized and thus incentives for R&D investments are
restored.3
This paper aims to ﬁll this gap by reconsidering the role of unions for the ﬁrms’ incentives
to invest in cost-reducing R&D activities when R&D spillovers are present and ﬁrms have the
option to form an RJV. Our envisaged model is a homogeneous unionized Cournot duopoly,
where ﬁrms can invest in cost-reducing R&D activities before adjusting their quantities in the
market. Each ﬁrm’s R&D output partially ﬂows to its rival, contributing to the latter’s unit
cost reduction. Workers are organized either in two ﬁrm-level unions (decentralized unionization
structure) or in an industry-wide union (centralized unionization structure). After ﬁrms have
chosen their R&D expenditures and before the market competition stage, ﬁrm-level unions set
2As d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) mention, “R&D externalities or spillovers imply that some ben-
eﬁts of each ﬁrm’s R&D ﬂow without payment to other ﬁrms” and this may cause free-riding behavior and
underinvestment problems. Empirical ﬁndings suggest that spillovers have signiﬁcant implications in real world
situations, as they aﬀect competitors’ average cost (Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989), labor productivity and total
factor productivity (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Frantzen, 2000).
3Recent papers establish the growing trends of RJVs formation (see e.g. Caloghirou et al., 2003; Hagedoorn
and van Kranenburg, 2003). Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) ﬁnd a positive correlation between participation
in RJVs, labor productivity and price-cost margins for European ﬁrms, sponsored under the EUREKA project
during 1992-1996.
2their ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates, or else the industry-wide union sets the uniform wage.4 At an
initial stage, ﬁrms have the option to form an RJV in order to invest cooperatively in the next
stage, or to stay separately. We thus extend d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) by adding
alternative unionization structures to their non-union model. 5
In the above setup we address the following three questions. First, how does the presence
of R&D spillovers aﬀect ﬁrms’ R&D investments, employment and output levels, ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and social welfare? Second, how does the unionization structure aﬀect equilibrium market
outcomes and welfare under alternative organizational forms of the R&D activity (RJVs or
non-cooperative R&D spending)? Third, how does the unionization structure aﬀect the ﬁrms’
incentives to form an RJV, and in particular when the formation of the RJV is costly?
With respect to the ﬁrst question, our results suggest that the eﬀects of R&D spillovers
on equilibrium market outcomes and welfare depend on both the unionization structure and
the organizational form of the R&D activity. In particular, each individual ﬁrm’s R&D invest-
ment increases in the spillover rate when ﬁrms form an RJV and internalize spillovers, while it
decreases when ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D and free-riding behavior prevails, inde-
pendently whether workers are organized in two-ﬁrm level unions or an industry-wide union.
Nevertheless, employment and output levels, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and welfare increase in the spillover
rate in most cases. The only exception is when ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D and
the unionization structure is either centralized or coordinated, in which case employment and
output levels, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and welfare increase in the spillover rate for spillovers below a
critical value. Yet, this critical value diﬀers not only across unionization structures but also
it is speciﬁc to each variable under consideration. Under the centralized regime, for instance,
this critical value is quite low for employment levels and quite high for ﬁrms’ proﬁts, implying
that equilibrium proﬁts are in most cases increasing in the spillover rate, while the opposite
is true for employment levels. The driving forces behind the above results are as follows. On
4In the extensions Section 7 we also consider the case where the industry-wide union can set diﬀerent wages
for the two ﬁrms (Coordinated unionization structure, see Hawcap and Wey, 2004). Moreover, we brieﬂyd i s c u s s
the case where, instead of union(s) wage setting, we have wage negotiations between ﬁrms and union(s).
5These are the unionization structures that prevail in the countries where most of the RJV active ﬁrms
operate. The decentralized regime of wage-setting ﬁts well with the cases of U.S.A., U.K. and Japan, which are
world-wide leaders in cooperative R&D partnerships (see Caloghirou et al., 2003); while the centralized regime
ﬁts well with collective bargaining systems in countries like Italy, Germany, France and Belgium, with the higher
participation in RJVs across the European Union (see Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002).
3the one hand, the impact of an increase in the spillover rate on a ﬁrm’s “eﬀective R&D in-
vestment level”, i.e. the aggregate R&D eﬀort in the industry that contributes to its unitary
cost reduction, is ceteris paribus positive. On the other hand, the union(s) hold-up behavior,
i.e. the extra rents that a union can extract through higher wage demands, can be negatively
or positively related with the spillover rate depending on the unionization structure. In par-
ticular, as in Hawcap and Wey (2004), we identify two types of the “hold-up” problem: the
“wage-level hold-up” and the “wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up”, referring respectively to the in-
crease in the ﬁrm’s wage rate and the ﬁrms’ wage diﬀerential due to an individual ﬁrm’s own
R&D eﬀort. When the unionization structure is decentralized, both the wage-level and the
wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up become less severe as the spillover rate increases. In contrast, un-
der centralized unionization, the wage-level hold-up becomes more severe as the spillover rate
increases, while the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up is null since both ﬁrms face a uniform wage.
Furthermore, under the coordinated unionization structure, the wage-level hold-up is indepen-
dent of the spillover rate, while the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up becomes less pronounced as
the spillover rate increases. Finally, the impact of the internalization of spillovers when ﬁrms
form an RJV on market outcomes and welfare are ceteris paribus more pronounced when the
spillover rate is high.
As far as the second question is concerned, we argue that the relation between R&D
expenditures and unionization depends crucially on the organizational mode of R&D activities
and the severity of the spillovers.6 In particular, our results reveal a partial reversal of the
“hold-up” argument. In fact, when ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D and spillovers are
suﬃciently low, R&D spending is higher when an industry-wide union sets a uniform wage
than when ﬁrm-level unions set their ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages; moreover, they are higher in the
latter case than when the industry-wide union coordinates its wage demands. In contrast, we
reconﬁrm the “hold-up” argument when spillovers are suﬃciently high, in which case R&D
investments are the highest under a decentralized unionization structure, while they are higher
under centralized than under coordinated unionization. On the other hand, when ﬁrms form
an RJV and invest cooperatively, our results are always in line with the “hold-up” argument.
6In a diﬀerent context, Mauleon et al. (2005) suggest that “the relationship between unions and R&D eﬀort
depends on the network architecture and on the spillovers”.
4Nevertheless, employment and output levels, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and welfare are always higher under
a decentralized than under a centralized unionization structure, while they lie in-between under
the coordinated unionization structure. Obviously, R&D expenses, employment and output
levels, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and welfare are always higher in a non-unionized than in a unionized
industry.
Coming back to the third question, we ﬁrst show that if the formation of an RJV is costless,
ﬁrms have always incentives to form an RJV, independently of the unionization structure. We
thus reconﬁrm the ﬁnding obtained in the non-union case (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988). Interestingly, RJVs lead to higher R&D investments than the non-cooperative R&D
spending but only if spillovers are high enough. Moreover, the spectrum of spillover rates for
which this holds depends crucially on the unionization structure. It is wider for the centralized
unionization structure than for the coordinated one, and as for the latter it is wider than that of
the decentralized unionization. An immediate consequence is that the ﬁrms’ incentives to form
an RJV diﬀer across unionization structures for any given spillover rate. For instance, ﬁrms
have stronger incentives to form an RJV under the centralized than under the decentralized
unionization structure whenever spillovers are suﬃciently low. Intuitively, each individual
ﬁrm’s incentives to participate in an RJV depend on two factors. The overall unit cost reduction
eﬀect and the R&D cost savings eﬀect. When spillovers are low, the RJV formation leads to
a relatively larger unit cost increase under the centralized rather than under the decentralized
unionization structure. This negative eﬀect is however dominated by the relatively larger R&D
cost savings eﬀect in the former than in the latter case. This reasoning is reversed if spillovers
are high (in which case the RJV induces instead a reduction in unit costs and an increase in
R&D expenditures). The above discussion implies that in the real world where the formation
of an RJV is often costly, ﬁrms may have incentives to form an RJV under one unionization
structure but not under another.
Our results further suggest that an increase in the unemployment beneﬁts strengthens the
unions’ wage demands and thus hinder ﬁrms’ R&D investments, leading to lower employ-
ment and output levels and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Finally, although ﬁr m sh a v ea l w a y si n c e n t i v e st o
participate in a costless RJV, such RJVs are often welfare detrimental. In particular, under
centralized unionization, an RJV reduces social welfare except if spillovers are quite high. In
5contrast, an RJV is welfare enhancing under decentralized unionization provided that spillovers
are not too low. Interestingly, the range of parameters for which welfare decreases due to the
formation of an RJV in a non unionized industry lies in-between the centralized and the de-
centralized unionization structures. We thus add to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) by
oﬀering a welfare analysis of RJVs in the non-union case too. Our analysis thus points out that
the alignment of market and social incentives for the formation of an RJV depends crucially
on the unionization structure. As the formation of an RJV is welfare enhancing under various
circumstances, policy measures that are intended to encourage RJVs should carefully be de-
signed, taking into account all the features of the industry, namely its unionization structure,
the severity of spillovers etc.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the existing literature on the impact of alternative unioniza-
tion structures on ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV. We reconﬁrm Calabuig and Gonzalez-
Maestre (2002) result that union centralization, as compared with decentralization, may pro-
vide stronger incentives to ﬁrms to spend on R&D. This hold-up reversal occurs however for
all market sizes whenever spillovers are low enough, and not only for small market sizes as Cal-
abuig and Gonzalez-Maestre argue. Moreover, when spillovers are high enough, in line with
the hold-up argument and contrary to Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre, union decentralization
leads to stronger incentives than centralization. Furthermore, as Haucap and Wey (2004), we
show that ﬁrms’ investment incentives are not monotone in the degree of centralization. Firms’
R&D incentives are the largest under the centralized unionization structure, the weakest under
the coordinated one, while under the decentralized unionization structure they lie in-between.
Nevertheless, this occurs only if spillovers are low enough. Otherwise, and in contrast to
Haucap and Wey (2004), decentralization creates stronger R&D incentives for ﬁrms than an
industry-wide union. Our analysis thus stresses the role of R&D spillovers for the magnitude
of the hold-up problem and the ensuing incentives of ﬁrms to invest in R&D.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic model and
the analysis of the benchmark case with no unions. In section 3, the cases of non-cooperative
R&D investments under ﬁrm-level unions and an industry-wide union are analyzed. In section
4, we study the respective cases when ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively. In section
5, the ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV are analyzed. Section 6 includes the welfare analysis.
6In Section 7 a number of extensions of the basic model are brieﬂy discussed. Finally, Section
8 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We consider a unionized homogenous good industry where two ﬁrms, denoted by i,j =1 ,2,i6=
j compete in quantities. The (inverse) demand function for the ﬁnal good is linear, and is
given by P (Q)=a − Q,w h e r eQ = q1 + q2 is the aggregate output. Firms are endowed
with constant returns to scale technologies that transform one unit of labor to one unit of
output; that is, qi = Li where qi and Li are respectively ﬁrm i’s output and employment
level. The unitary transformation cost of labor to output is constant and initially is equal
to c for both ﬁrms. In addition to the transformation cost, each ﬁrm i incurs labor costs
that are equal to wi per unit of labor, where wi is its wage rate. Hence, ﬁrm i’s cost per
unit of output initially equals c + wi. However, ﬁrm i, by investing x2
i in R&D activities, can
reduce its unitary transformation cost by xi.7 Moreover, due to technological spillovers, each
ﬁrm beneﬁts from its rival’s investments. In particular, ﬁrm i’s unitary transformation cost
is reduced by δxj,where xj is ﬁrm j’s investment level and δ is the spillover rate, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Therefore, ﬁrm i’s total cost function is given by Ci(.)=( wi + c − xi − δxj)Li+x2
i.N o t et h a t
this cost function reﬂects diminishing returns to scale to R&D expenditures.
In this industry R&D activities can be carried out under two alternative forms: (i) non-
cooperatively (nc),w h e r eﬁrms choose their R&D expenditures simultaneously and indepen-
dently and (ii) cooperatively (c),w h e r eﬁrms form a Research Joint Venture (RJV) and decide
together their R&D expenditures in order to maximize their joint proﬁts, while remaining
competitors in the ﬁnal good market.8
The industry is unionized and all workers have identical skills. Workers are organized either
in two ﬁrm-level unions (Decentralized regime, D), or in one industry-wide union (Centralized
regime, C). The unionization structure is exogenously given. Unions are assumed to maximize
7It can be shown that if one uses the labor saving process innovation, that has been employed in the bulk of
the literature for the union eﬀects on R&D investments for process innovations, the results will be qualitatively
similar.
8Following d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we assume that pre-RJV spillovers and post-RJV spillovers
are equal and are thus captured by the same spillover rate δ.
7the rents of their members. In the decentralized regime, the union i’s objective is Ui (wi,L i)=
(wi − w0)Li,w h e r ew0 is the workers’ outside option,9 while in the centralized regime the
industry-wide union’s objective is U (w,Li,L j)=( w − w0)(Li + Lj),w h e r ew is the uniform
industry wage rate.10 In our basic model, we assume that unions have all the power to set
wages, while ﬁrms choose their employment level subsequently (Monopoly Union model).11
We consider the following four-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide whether to form
an RJV (c) or stay separately (nc). In the second stage, if ﬁrms have chosen to form an
RJV, they decide cooperatively their R&D expenses in order to maximize their joint proﬁts.
Otherwise, ﬁrms decide simultaneously and independently their R&D expenses. In the third
stage, the industry-wide union sets the uniform industry wage rate in the Centralized regime
(C); or the two unions set simultaneously and independently their ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates in
the Decentralized regime (D). Finally, in the last stage, ﬁrms choose their employment and
output levels. The equilibrium concept employed is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.1 The Benchmark Case: No Unions
Before considering non-cooperative and cooperative R&D investments under alternative union-
ized structures, we brieﬂy present the analysis of the benchmark case with no unions (nU)i n
which ﬁr m sf a c eal a b o rc o s te q u a lt ot h ew o r k e r s ’o u t s i d eo p t i o n ,w0.12 In the last stage of




πi =( a − Li − Lj)Li − (w0 + c − xi − δxj)Li − x2
i (1)
Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and solving the system of equations, we get the employ-
ment (and output) level:
9w0 is typically a weighted average of the competitive wage and the unemployment beneﬁts, the weights
being respectively the probability of a worker to ﬁnd a job or not in the competitive sector. As unemployment
beneﬁts inﬂuence the level of w0, the latter can be considered in our setup as a labor market policy instrument.
10The case where the industry-wide union can set diﬀerent wages for the two ﬁrms (Coordinated regime) is
brieﬂy presented in Section 7.
11Although in real life wages and, in some cases employment, is determined via ﬁrm-union negotiations, a
standard simplifying assumption in the “union-oligopoly” literature is that the union has all the power in wage
negotiations, while the ﬁrm has all the power to set the employment level (see e.g. Haucap and Wey, 2004;
Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004; and the references therein). In Section 7 we extend our analysis to the more general
case where wages are the outcome of negotiations between ﬁrm(s) and union(s) (Right-to-Manage model).




[(a − c − w0)+xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (2)
Observe that qi increases with ﬁrm i’s R&D eﬀort xi. It also increases with its rival ﬁrm’s
R&D eﬀort xj, but only if the spillover rate is high enough (δ>0.5); otherwise, qi decreases
with xj.
In the previous stage, under non-cooperative R&D investments, each ﬁrm i chooses its
R&D investment to maximize proﬁts πi = Li(xi,x j)2 −x2
i. From the ﬁrst order conditions, we
get the ﬁrm’s equilibrium R&D investment level,
xnU
nc =
(2 − δ)(a − c − w0)
7 − δ + δ2 (3)
Then the equilibrium employment level and ﬁrm’s proﬁts are:
LnU
nc =
3(a − c − w0)
7 − δ + δ2 ; πnU
nc =
(5 − δ)(1 + δ)(a − c − w0)2
(7 − δ + δ2)2 (4)
If instead the two ﬁrms form an RJV, they choose (x1,x 2) to maximize their joint proﬁts
π1 +π2 = L1(x1,x 2)2 +L2(x1,x 2)2 −x2
1 −x2
2.> F r o mt h eﬁrst order conditions and symmetry
we get the ﬁrm’s equilibrium R&D investment level,
xnU
c =
(1 + δ)(a − c − w0)
8 − 2δ − δ2 (5)
Then the equilibrium employment level and ﬁrm’s proﬁts are:
LnU
c =
3(a − c − w0)
8 − 2δ − δ2 ; πnU
c =
(a − c − w0)2
8 − 2δ − δ2 (6)
Let ﬁrm i’s ‘eﬀective R&D investment level’, ei, be the aggregate R&D eﬀo r tt h a tc o n -
tributes to its unitary transformation cost reduction, that is ei = xi+δxj. One can then easily
check the impact of an increase in technological spillovers δ on the equilibrium variables. The
following Lemma summarizes the results for the non-unionized industry case.
Lemma 1 In a non-unionized industry:
(i) When ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively, individual ﬁrm’s investments decrease in the spillover
9rate δ.E ﬀective R&D investment level, employment and output are increasing (decreasing) in
δ when δ<0.5( δ>0.5).F i n a l l y ,ﬁrms’ proﬁts always increase in δ.
(ii) When ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively, individual ﬁrm’s investments, ef-
fective R&D investment level, employment and output, and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are increasing in the
spillover rate δ.
(iii) If the formation of an RJV is costless, ﬁrms have always incentives to form an RJV.
Moreover, R&D investments are higher under an RJV than when ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively
if and only if δ>0.5.
It is well known that when ﬁrms decide their R&D eﬀorts in a non-cooperative way, tech-
nological spillovers have a negative impact on each ﬁrm’s incentives to invest in R&D because
its rival can free-ride on those investments. Clearly, ﬁrms can internalize spillovers by forming
an RJV. The ﬁrms’ joint (gross) proﬁts increase with the spillover rate in this case, leading
thus to higher individual ﬁrms’ R&D investments as δ increases. An immediate consequence
is that the eﬀective R&D investment level, which is equal to each ﬁrm’s unit cost reduction,
increases with the spillover rate under an RJV.
In contrast, when ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D, the eﬀective R&D investment
level is not monotonic in δ. In fact, this relation is inverted U-shaped, with the maximum of
the eﬀective R&D investment level attained at δ =0 .5. This implies that when the spillover
rate is initially high enough, a further increase in δ leads to a lower unit cost reduction for
the ﬁrms. This is so because when δ>0.5, R&D investment levels are strategic complements
(using (2), one can see that ∂2πi/∂xi∂xj > 0). As δ increases, an individual ﬁrm decreases
its R&D eﬀort, not only because its rival free-rides on its own investments, but also because
it optimally responds to its rival’s reduction of R&D eﬀort (resulting in turn from the ﬁrm’s
free-riding on its rival’s investments).
Clearly, employment and output levels follow the same pattern as the eﬀective R&D in-
vestments both in the non-cooperative and the cooperative investment case. Yet, ﬁrms’ proﬁts
always increase with the spillover rate δ, independently of the mode of R&D investments. When
ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D, as δ becomes higher, an individual ﬁrm decreases its
R&D investments and thus saves on R&D costs (R&D cost savings eﬀect). It also obtains
higher gross proﬁts when δ<0.5, due to the increase in the eﬀective R&D investment level
10(unit cost reduction eﬀect). This latter eﬀect becomes negative for higher spillover rates, but
it is dominated by the former positive eﬀect and as a result proﬁts are always increasing in δ.
When ﬁrms form an RJV, as δ becomes higher, each ﬁrm increases its R&D investments, but
at the same time its gross proﬁts increase due to the increase in the eﬀective R&D investment
level. The positive unit cost reduction eﬀect dominates the negative R&D cost savings eﬀect
and thus proﬁts increase with δ in this case too.
Finally, one can easily check from (4) and (6) that ﬁrms have always incentives to form an
RJV. This holds only if the formation of an RJV is costless for the ﬁrms, a condition which
is however rarely met in reality. It is thus worth identifying the circumstances under which
ﬁrms have stronger incentives to form an RJV. Deﬁning MnU = πnU
c − πnU
nc , one can check that
an individual ﬁrm’s incentives to form an RJV become weaker as the workers’ outside option
w0 increases. More interestingly, they have a U-shaped relation with δ. An individual ﬁrm’s
incentives are null for δ =0 .5, take their highest value in the full spillover case (δ =1 )a n dt h e
second highest value in the zero spillover case (δ =0 ). Finally, it is worth noting that an RJV
leads to higher R&D investments, as compared with the non-cooperative R&D investment case
as long as δ>δ nU ≡ 0.5 (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).13
3 Non-cooperative R&D Investments
3.1 Firm-level Unions
We consider ﬁrst the case in which ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D (nc) and unions
are organized at the ﬁrm-level (D). In the last stage of the game, each ﬁrm i chooses its
employment (and output) level to maximize proﬁts:
max
Li
πi =( a − Li − Lj)Li − (wi + c − xi − δxj)Li − x2
i (7)
Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and solving the system of equations, employment and
output levels are:




nc if and only if δ>0.5.
11Li(wi,w j,x i,x j)=
1
3




[(a − c) − wi − ∆w + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (9)
where ∆w = wi − wj is the ﬁrms’ wage diﬀerential. Observe that Li decreases with ﬁrm
i’s wage rate wi and increases with its rival ﬁrm’s wage wj. More importantly, Li decreases
with the wage diﬀerential ∆w (for any given wi). Similar observations apply for the ﬁrm i’s
equilibrium proﬁts, πi(.)=Li(.)2−x2
i. In particular, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts decrease with its own wage
rate wi as well as with the ﬁrms’ wage diﬀerential ∆w. In the third stage, ﬁrm-level unions






(wi − w0)[(a − c) − 2wi + wj + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (10)




[5(a − c +2 w0)+xi (7 − 2δ)+xj (7δ − 2)] (11)
Clearly, wi increases with the workers’ outside option w0. More importantly, wi increases
with the ﬁrm i’s own R&D eﬀort xi. The latter reﬂects the well-known wage-level hold-up
problem. Since a higher R&D eﬀort will lead, via its union’s future claims on extra rents, to
a higher wage rate for the ﬁrm, a unionized ﬁrm has weaker incentives to spend on R&D than
its non-union counterpart. Moreover, wi increases with the rival ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort but only if
the spillover rate is not too low (i.e. for all δ>0.286). In contrast, if δ<0.286,a ni n c r e a s ei n
ﬁrm j’s R&D eﬀort has a positive impact on ﬁrm i because it reduces the wage rate set by its
own union. Yet, there is an additional hold-up problem, the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up (see
Haucap and Wey, 2004). In particular, from (11) ∆wD(xi,x j) ≡ wi(.)−wj(.)=
3(1−δ)
5 (xi−xj);
hence the wage diﬀerential is positively related to the ﬁrm i’s R&D eﬀort. As a consequence,
ah i g h e rR & De ﬀort will lead to a higher wage diﬀerential between the two ﬁrms and thus to
weaker incentives for ﬁrm i to spend on R&D.
In the second stage, ﬁrms invest simultaneously in R&D eﬀorts, each to maximize its own













4(7− 2δ)(a − c − w0)
8δ2 − 20δ + 377
(13)
Using (13), we get respectively each ﬁrm’s equilibrium wage rate, employment and output
level, and proﬁts:
wD
nc = w0 +
135(a − c − w0)




90(a − c − w0)




4(59− 4δ)(31+4δ)(a − c − w0)
2
¡
8δ2 − 20δ + 377
¢2 (16)
As in the non-unionized industry case, here too, technological spillovers have a negative
impact on the individual ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D due to the free-riding eﬀect. From
(13) it can be seen that the higher the spillover rate δ is, the lower is a ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort in
equilibrium. Yet, the eﬀective R&D investment level, eD
nc =( 1+δ)xD
nc,i n c r e a s e s always with
δ. The intuition is as follows. Consider an increase in the spillover rate when δ>0.5.F o r
exogenously given wage rates, such an increase would have lead to a decrease in eD
nc (Lemma 1).
However, when wages are endogenous, future wage claims by its union discourage a ﬁrm from
spending on R&D. Yet, as δ increases, both the wage-level and the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up







5 .A sar e s u l t ,a n
individual ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort reduction due to its own union’s rent seeking behavior becomes
less pronounced. This positive feedback eﬀect in turn implies that an individual ﬁrm’s R&D
eﬀort decreases with δ by less when wages are endogenous than when they are exogenously
given. In fact, by (13) and (5), | ∂xD
nc/∂δ |<| ∂xnU
nc /∂δ |. Therefore, when wages are set by
13ﬁrm-level unions, eﬀective R&D investment level is increasing in the spillover rate for all values
of δ.
An immediate consequence is that a ﬁrm’s transformation cost reduction is larger when
the spillover rate is higher. This, in turn, allows unions to push for higher wages in the
subsequent wage-setting stage as δ increases. Nevertheless, labor costs rise by less than the
reduction of the transformation costs, and as a result, overall cost reduction, eD
nc− wD
nc, turns
out to be increasing in the spillover rate. In fact, by (13) and (14), one can check that ∂(eD
nc−
wD
nc)/∂δ > 0. Therefore, employment level, output and ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase as technological
spillovers become more prominent. The following Lemma summarizes:
Lemma 2 When ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D and wage-setting is decentralized, an
individual ﬁrm’s R&D investment decreases with the spillover rate δ.E ﬀective R&D invest-
ment, wage rates, overall cost reduction, employment and output levels, and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
increasing in δ.
It can also be checked that an increase in the workers’ outside option - for instance, an
increase in the unemployment beneﬁts set by the government - has a negative impact on the
individual and the eﬀective R&D investments, as well as on the overall cost reduction, the
employment and output levels and the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. This is because the increase in w0 leads
to a higher wage paid by the ﬁrms to their employees.
3.2 An Industry-wide Union
When an industry-wide union sets a uniform wage (C unionization structure), in the last stage
of the game, output and employment are given by (8) when wi = wj = w. In the third stage,





(w − w0)[2(a − c) − 2w +( xi + xj)(1+δ)] (17)




[2(a − c + w0)+( xi + xj)(1+δ)] (18)
14As expected, the wage rate increases with the workers’ outside option. Interestingly, it increases
with both ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀorts. This reﬂects the wage-level hold up problem. An increase in
ﬁrm i’s R&D eﬀort leads, via the industry-wide union’s future claims on extra rents, to a
higher industry wage w,i . e . ∂w
∂xi = 1+δ
4 . Knowing this, ﬁrm i has weaker incentives to spend
on R&D. Obviously, there is no wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up in the centralized regime, because
both ﬁrms face the uniform wage rate set by the industry-wide union.
In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously invest in R&D, each maximizing its proﬁts, which









>From the ﬁrst order conditions of (19) and symmetry, the equilibrium R&D investment is:
xC
nc =
(7 − 5δ)(a − c − w0)
5δ2 − 2δ +6 5
(20)
Using (20), we get respectively the equilibrium wage, and each ﬁrm’s employment level and
proﬁts:
wC
nc = w0 +
36(a − c − w0)




12(a − c − w0)




5(1+δ)(19 − 5δ)(a − c − w0)
2
¡
5δ2 − 2δ +6 5
¢2 (23)
In this case too, due to the rival’s free-riding, an individual ﬁrm’s incentives to invest in
R&D become weaker as δ increases. However, in contrast to the decentralized regime, when an
industry-wide union sets a uniform wage rate the eﬀective R&D investment, eC
nc =( 1+δ)xC
nc,
decreases with the spillover rate whenever δ is not too low (i.e. for all δ>0.2). In fact,
the relation between eC
nc and δ is inverted U-shaped, with its maximum attained at δ =0 .2.
The intuition is as follows. Consider an increase in the spillover rate when δ<0.5. For an
15exogenously given wage rate, such an increase would have lead to an increase in eC
nc (Lemma
1). Yet, when the wage rate is endogenous, wage claims by the industry-wide union in the
subsequent stage discourage ﬁrms from spending on R&D. In addition, as δ increases, the wage-
level hold-up problem becomes more severe, since from (18) ∂wC
∂xi = 1+δ
4 (recall that in this case,
there is no wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up). Therefore, the individual ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort reduction
due to industry-wide union’s rent seeking behavior becomes larger. This, in turn, implies that
an individual ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort decreases with δ by more when the wage is endogenous than
when it is exogenously given. In fact, by (20) and (3), | ∂xC
nc/∂δ |>| ∂xnU
nc /∂δ |.A sar e s u l t ,
when a uniform wage rate is set by an industry-wide union, eﬀective R&D investment level
decreases for a wider spectrum of values of δ, i.e. for all δ>0.2.
Clearly then, the uniform industry wage rate wC
nc, the overall cost reduction (eC
nc − wC
nc),
and the employment and output levels follow the same pattern as the eﬀective R&D investment
level. Finally, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are not monotonic in the spillover rate; they are increasing with
δ for all δ<0.861 and decreasing for higher spillover rates. This is so because if δ is not too
high, the positive R&D cost savings eﬀect (due to the individual ﬁrm’s R&D investments being
decreasing in δ) dominates the negative unit cost reduction eﬀect (due to the ﬁrm’s overall
cost reduction being decreasing in δ for all δ>0.2).T h e f o r m e r e ﬀect dominates the latter
f o rh i g h e rv a l u e so fδ and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts decrease with the spillover rate if δ>0.861.T h e
following Lemma summarizes:
Lemma 3 When ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D and wage-setting is centralized, an in-
dividual ﬁrm’s R&D investment decreases with the spillover rate δ.E ﬀective R&D investments,
the wage rate, overall cost reduction, employment and output levels are decreasing (increasing)
in δ for all δ>0.2( δ<0.2).F i n a l l y ,ﬁrms’ proﬁts are decreasing (increasing) in δ for all
δ>0.861 (δ<0.861).
As in the decentralized wage setting case, in this case too, an increase in w0 leads to a
higher uniform industry wage rate and as a result, it has a negative impact on the individual
and eﬀective R&D investments, as well as on the overall cost reduction, the employment and
output levels and the ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
163.3 A Comparison
We turn now to the comparison of the equilibrium outcomes of the decentralized and the
centralized wage-setting regime when ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D. Our discussion
above reveals that the individual ﬁrm’s investment, as a function of the spillover rate, is steeper
when an industry-wide union sets the uniform wage rate than when two ﬁrm-level unions set
the ﬁrm speciﬁc wages. This is because | ∂xC
nc/∂δ |>| ∂xnU
nc /∂δ |> | ∂xD
nc/∂δ |.M o r e o v e r ,i t




nc(1). As a consequence, we have the
following result:
Proposition 1 (i) R&D investments in the industry are higher under a centralized rather
than under a decentralized regime if and only if technological spillovers are low enough, i.e.
δ<0.565.
(ii) Firms’ employment level, overall cost reduction and proﬁts are always higher, while
wages are always lower, under a decentralized rather than under a centralized regime.
The intuition goes as follows. Due to wage under-cutting between ﬁrm-level unions, wage
rates are always lower under a decentralized regime rather than when an industry-wide union
sets a uniform wage. Nevertheless, under the decentralized regime, the most severe wage-level
and wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up problems occur when there are no spillovers (δ =0 ). This is
so, because as we have seen above, the wage-level and wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up decrease
in δ under the decentralized regime. In contrast, under the centralized regime, the wage-level
hold-up increases in δ, and thus it is the least severe when δ =0(Recall that there is no
wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up in this case).
The relative severity of the hold-up under ﬁrm-level union wage-setting overturns the rel-
atively softer unions’ rent-extracting eﬀect and as a result, individual ﬁrms have stronger
incentives to spend on R&D under the centralized regime whenever spillovers are low enough.
The opposite is true when the spillover rate is relatively high. In fact, if δ =1 , the wage-
diﬀerentiation hold-up is null in the decentralized regime too. Moreover, the wage-level hold-
up takes its lowest (highest) value under the decentralized (centralized) regime. Therefore, as
the unions’ rent-extracting eﬀect is weaker under the decentralized regime, ﬁrms have stronger
incentives to spend on R&D rather than under the centralized regime.
17Interestingly enough, our ﬁndings reveal a partial reversal of the hold-up problem. Although
ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D are always lower in a unionized than in a non-unionized




nc for all δ),
Proposition 1 tells us that a more centralized unionization structure provides stronger R&D
incentives to ﬁrms than a less centralized one whenever spillovers are low enough (δ<0.565).
This is in contrast to the conventional wisdom according to which the more severe is the unions’
rent-extracting behavior, the lower are the ﬁrms investments in R&D.
Finally, overall cost reduction and employment are higher under ﬁrm-level wage setting
than when an industry-wide union sets a uniform wage rate. This is because, ﬁrstly, wage
rates are always lower under the decentralized rather than under the centralized regime; and
secondly, R&D investments are higher for all δ>0.565 in this case. Nevertheless, even if δ
is low, the negative eﬀect due to lower R&D investments is dominated by the former positive
eﬀect and thus overall cost reduction and employment and output levels are higher under ﬁrm-
level wage setting. As a consequence, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher under the decentralized than
under the centralized regime. The lower overall cost reduction eﬀect is reinforced by the R&D
cost savings eﬀect for low spillover rates, while for higher spillover rates, the negative eﬀect on
proﬁts due to higher R&D spending is dominated by the positive overall cost reduction eﬀect.
4 Cooperative R&D investments
4.1 Firm-level unions
We turn next to the case where ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively in R&D under a
decentralized wage-setting regime. The last two stages of the game are as in Subsection 3.1
and employment levels and wage rates are given by (8) and (11) respectively. In the second















18Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and solving the system of equations, we get the (symmet-
ric) equilibrium R&D investment for each ﬁrm:
xD
c =
4(1+δ)(a − c − w0)
77 − 8δ − 4δ2 (25)
Using (25), we obtain the equilibrium wage rates, the employment levels and the ﬁrms’
proﬁts, respectively,
wD
c = w0 +
27(a − c − w0)
77 − 8δ − 4δ2 (26)
LD
c =
18(a − c − w0)
77 − 8δ − 4δ2 (27)
πD
c =
4(a − c − w0)
2
77 − 8δ − 4δ2 (28)
When ﬁrms form an RJV and decide jointly their R&D expenditures, ﬁrms’ strategic R&D
spending in order each to increase its market share is absent. Furthermore, due to the inter-
nalization of spillovers, the ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D become stronger as technological
spillovers rise. This is so because the wage-level and the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up problems
under decentralized wage-setting become less severe as δ increases (see Subsection 3.1). As a
result, the ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts are increasing in δ for all symmetric ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures (i.e.
for all xi = xj, see (24)). Clearly then, the eﬀective R&D investment level, eD
c =( 1+δ)xD
c ,
increases with δ. Furthermore, although unions push for higher wages as the spillover rate
increases, overall cost reduction, employment and output levels as well as ﬁrms’ gross proﬁts
increase with δ. T h ep o s i t i v eu n i tc o s tr e d u c t i o ne ﬀect dominates the negative R&D cost sav-
ings eﬀect due to higher R&D expenditures and thus ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase with the spillover
rate. The following Lemma summarizes:
Lemma 4 When ﬁrms form an RJV and wage-setting is decentralized, individual ﬁrm’s R&D
investment, eﬀective R&D investment level, wage rates, overall cost reduction, employment
and output levels, and ﬁrms’ proﬁt sa r ei n c r e a s i n gi nt h es p i l l o v e rr a t eδ.
Finally, the impact of the workers’ outside option on the equilibrium outcome is qualita-
19tively similar to that in the case of non-cooperative R&D investments and ﬁrm-level unions.
4.2 An Industry-wide Union
When ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively in R&D under a centralized regime, the last
two stages of the game are as in Subsection 3.2 and employment levels and the uniform wage
rate are given by (8) and (18). In the second stage, ﬁrms choose their R&D investments so as















Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and solving the system of equations, we get the (symmet-
ric) equilibrium R&D investment for each ﬁrm:
xC
c =
(1 + δ)(a − c − w0)
35 − 2δ − δ2 (30)
Using (30), we get the equilibrium uniform wage rate, the employment levels and individual
ﬁrms’ proﬁts, respectively:
wC
c = w0 +
18(a − c − w0)
35 − 2δ − δ2 (31)
LC
c =
6(a − c − w0)
35 − 2δ − δ2 (32)
πC
c =
(a − c − w0)
2
35 − 2δ − δ2 (33)
A similar reasoning as under the decentralized regime applies for the centralized wage-setting
case. Since ﬁrms form an RJV, spillovers are internalized and moreover, there is no strate-
gic R&D spending by the ﬁrms. This implies that the equilibrium outcome depends on the
spillover rate in a qualitatively similar way to that of the decentralized unionization structure.
In fact, all the intuitive arguments are as in Subsection 4.1, with the only exception that the
20wage-level hold-up problem becomes more severe as δ increases (see Subsection 3.2). Never-
theless, the ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts again increase with δ for all xi = xj (see (29)). The following
Lemma summarizes:
Lemma 5 When ﬁrms form an RJV and wage-setting is centralized, individual ﬁrm’s R&D
investment, eﬀective R&D investment level, wage rates, overall cost reduction, employment
and output levels, and ﬁrms’ proﬁt sa r ei n c r e a s i n gi nt h es p i l l o v e rr a t eδ.
Note also that the impact of the workers’ outside option on the equilibrium outcome is
qualitatively similar to all the cases analyzed previously.
4.3 A Comparison
We next compare the equilibrium outcomes of the decentralized and the centralized wage-
setting regimes when ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively in R&D. As we have seen
in Subsection 3.3, as δ increases, the wage-level and the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up problems
become less severe under the decentralized regime. In contrast, under the centralized regime,
the wage-level hold-up becomes more severe as δ increases, while the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-
up is absent. An immediate consequence is that the individual ﬁrm’s investment, as a function
of the spillover rate, is less steep under centralized rather than under decentralized wage-
setting, i.e. 0 <∂ x C
c /∂δ < ∂xD
c /∂δ. Moreover, since an industry-wide union is able to extract
higher rents than the two competing ﬁrm-level unions (wC
c >w D
c ), R&D investments are lower
under a centralized rather than under a decentralized regime, i.e. xC
c <x D
c for all δ. As a
result, we obtain the following:
Proposition 2 R&D investments in the industry, overall cost reduction, employment and
output levels, and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are always higher, while wages are always lower, under a
decentralized rather than under a centralized regime.
When ﬁrms form an RJV and decide jointly their R&D investments, it is only the mode
of industry unionization that drives the results. In addition, the ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in
R&D are always lower in a unionized rather than in a non-unionized industry (from (5), (25)









An immediate consequence is that overall cost reduction, employment and output levels are
higher under decentralized rather than under centralized wage-setting. Firms’ proﬁts are higher
too, because the positive eﬀect due to lower overall cost reduction under the decentralized
regime dominates the negative eﬀect due to higher R&D costs.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the eﬀect of alternative unionization structures on R&D
investments depends crucially on whether technological spillovers are internalized or not. In
particular, for relatively low spillovers (δ<0.565), a more centralized unionization structure
leads to higher R&D investments when spillovers are not internalized, while the opposite is true
when ﬁrms form an RJV and internalize those spillovers. This ﬁnding is novel in the literature
and is in contrast with the conventional wisdom which predicts a negative correlation between
union centralization and R&D investment level.
5F i r m s ’ I n c e n t i v e s t o F o r m a n R J V
We now turn to the ﬁrst stage of the game and investigate the ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV
under alternative unionization structures. First of all, we reconﬁrm for a unionized industry the
ﬁnding obtained for a non-unionized one (see Lemma 1(iii)). That is, whenever the formation
of an RJV is costless, ﬁrms have always incentives to form an RJV, independently whether
the unionization structure is centralized or decentralized. Indeed, from (16), (28), (23) and




nc for all δ (with strict inequality
for all, but one, values of δ). The intuition is straightforward. By forming an RJV, ﬁrms are
able to coordinate their R&D expenditure decisions in the second stage and thus attain two
goals. First, they internalize the spillovers, avoiding any free-riding behavior; and second, they
are better equipped to face the unions’ hold up in the subsequent stage. This is, of course,
independent of the degree of technological spillovers or the level of wage setting in the industry.
Interestingly enough, the range of spillover rates for which R&D investments are higher
under an RJV rather than under non-cooperative R&D investments depends crucially on the
unionization structure. In fact, from (13) and (25), it can be checked that xD
c >x D
nc for all
22δ>δ D ≡ 0.286; while from (20) and (30), xC
c >x C
nc for all δ>δ C ≡ 0.714.W h e n ﬁrm-
level unions set the wage rates, R&D investments are higher under an RJV provided that the
spillover rate is not too low. Observe that this holds for a wider range of parameter values rather
than in a non-unionized industry where the critical value of the spillover rate is δnU =0 .5.
On the other hand, when an industry-wide union sets a uniform wage rate, an RJV promotes
R&D investments for a smaller spectrum of parameter values, i.e. only if δ is large enough. If
e.g. δ =0 .4, an RJV will promote R&D investments only under a decentralized wage-setting,
but not in a non-unionized industry or under a centralized wage-setting regime. The reasoning
is as follows. As explained above, the rate of reduction of a ﬁrm’s R&D investment with δ is
smaller under ﬁrm-level rather than under industry-wide union wage-setting whenever ﬁrms
invest non-cooperatively in R&D. In contrast, under an RJV, the rate of increase of a ﬁrm’s
R&D investment with δ is larger in the former rather than in the latter case. Also, when there
are no spillovers (δ =0 ), the individual ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort diﬀerential between non-cooperative
R&D investments and an RJV is larger under a centralized than under a decentralized regime,
i.e. xC
nc(0) − xC
c (0) >x D
nc(0) − xD
c (0). This is an immediate consequence of the fact that, in
contrast to the ﬁrm-level wage-setting case, there is no wage-diﬀerentiation hold up when an
industry-wide union sets the wage rate (see Haucap and Wey, 2004). On the contrary, in the
full spillovers case, we have xC
c (1) − xC
nc(1) <x D
c (1) − xD
nc(1), i.e. the individual ﬁrm’s R&D
eﬀort diﬀerential between an RJV and non-cooperative R&D investments is larger under a
decentralized rather than under a centralized regime. This is due to the fact that, when δ =1 ,
the wage-level hold up is the most severe under an industry-wide union, while both the wage-
level and the wage-diﬀerentiation hold up problems are the least severe under ﬁrm-level unions.
Finally, it can be checked that wages, overall cost reduction, employment and output levels
follow the same pattern as the investment levels. Indeed, they turn out to be higher under an
RJV rather than under non-cooperative R&D investments for a wider range of spillover rates
in the decentralized regime as compared to the centralized one.
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 3 (i) If the formation of an RJV is costless, ﬁrms have always incentives to
form an RJV, independently of the unionization structure.
(ii) R&D investments, wages, and employment and output levels are higher under an RJV
23rather than under non-cooperative R&D spending if and only if δ>δ D ≡ 0.286 (δ>δ C ≡
0.714) in the decentralized (centralized) wage-setting regime.
In reality, however, the formation of an RJV often involves administration and coordination
costs that are substantial for the participating ﬁrms. It is thus worth identifying the circum-
stances under which ﬁr m sh a v es t r o n g e ri n c e n t i v e st of o r ma nR J V ,a sw e l la si n v e s t i g a t et h e
role of the unionization structure for the magnitude of these incentives. Deﬁne MD = πD
c −πD
nc
and MC = πC
c − πD
nc, where MD and MC measure the magnitude of an individual ﬁrm’s in-
centive to participate in an RJV under respectively ﬁrm-level unions and an industry-wide
union.
In Figure 1 MD and MC have been plotted as functions of the spillover rate δ (where
w.l.o.g. a − c − w0 has been normalized to 1). The following observations are in order. First,
the magnitude of the ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV is non-monotone in the spillover rate
under neither unionization structure. In particular, just like in the non-union case, it obtains
its highest value for zero or full spillovers and is null for some intermediate value of δ. Second,
the latter value diﬀers across unionization structures; it is relatively low (δD =0 .286) under
decentralized wage-setting and relatively high (δC =0 .714) under the centralized one, while
it is in between in the non-union case (δ =0 .5, see Lemma 1(iii)). Third, the strongest RJV
incentives are observed when spillovers are zero under an industry-wide union, while, just like
in the non-union case, they obtain their highest value when spillovers are full under ﬁrm-level
unions. Last, but not least, the ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV are stronger under the
centralized rather than under the decentralized regime whenever spillovers are suﬃciently low,
i.e. δ<δ M =0 .534; and vice versa.
Interestingly enough, the magnitude of the ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV depend not
only on the spillover rate, but more importantly on the unionization structure. If, for instance,
δ =0 .3 and the RJV formation costs are equal to 0.001(a −c − w0)2, ﬁrms have no incentives
to form an RJV when they face ﬁrm-level unions, while they do so under an industry-wide
union. Note that the opposite is true for δ =0 .8 (see Figure 1).
The intuition goes as follows. An individual ﬁrm’s incentives to participate in an RJV
depend on two factors. The overall unit cost reduction eﬀect and the R&D cost savings eﬀect.
When spillovers are low, the RJV formation leads to a relatively larger unit cost increase









Figure 1: Incentives to form an RJV in case of ﬁrm-level unions (MD) and an industry-wide
union (MC).
under the centralized rather than under the decentralized unionization structure. At the same
time, it leads to relatively larger R&D cost savings in the former case rather than in the
latter case. This positive R&D cost savings eﬀect dominates the negative unit cost increase
eﬀect and ﬁrms have stronger incentives to form an RJV in the presence of an industry-wide
union rather than under ﬁrm-level unions. In contrast, if spillovers are high, the RJV leads
to a relatively higher unit cost reduction and a relatively larger increase in R&D expenditures
under the decentralized rather than under the centralized regime. The latter negative eﬀect
is dominated by the former positive eﬀect and thus the decentralized regime oﬀers stronger
incentives for ﬁrms to form an RJV when spillovers are high. An immediate consequence of
the above discussion is that theree x i s t sa ni n t e r m e d i a t ev a l u eo fδ, δM =0 .534, such that for
all δ<δ M ﬁrms’ have stronger incentives to form an RJV under a centralized than under a
decentralized regime (and vice versa).
Our ﬁndings are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 Firms’ incentives to form an RJV are non-monotone in the spillover rate
25and are strongest for zero spillovers under a centralized regime and for full spillovers under a
decentralized regime. Moreover, ﬁrms have stronger incentives to form an RJV under central-
ized than under decentralized wage-setting whenever spillovers are low enough, i.e. δ<0.534;
otherwise, they have weaker incentives.
6 Welfare analysis
In this Section we perform a welfare analysis and compare the regulator’s incentives to encour-
age the formation of an RJV with the ﬁrms’ incentives. Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of
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One can easily check that SWD
nc >S W C
nc and SWD
c >S W C
c . Thus, a centralized wage-
setting regime leads always to lower social welfare than a decentralized one, independently
whether ﬁrms form, or not, an RJV. The intuition is straightforward. Firms’ proﬁts and con-
sumers’ surplus are always higher under a decentralized wage-setting regime. In contrast, the
unions’ rents are always higher under centralized wage-setting. The latter eﬀect is dominated
by the former and social welfare turns out to be higher under ﬁrm-level unions. It can further
26be checked that welfare is always higher in the absence of unions rather than in any unionized
industry.14 Clearly, due to the unions’ hold up, ﬁrms have weaker incentives to invest in cost-
reducing R&D activities. At the same time, unionized ﬁrms face higher labor costs. Therefore,
consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are lower under the presence of unions. As the unions’
rents cannot compensate for the losses in the consumer surplus and the ﬁrms’ proﬁts, welfare
is lower in a unionized industry. The above suggest that policy makers should take measures
to promote labor market ﬂexibility such that wages reﬂect better the ﬁrms’ productivity, e.g.
via establishing a more decentralized wage-setting regime in R&D intensive industries.15
In a similar vein, unemployment beneﬁts w0 lead to lower social welfare in all cases, be-
cause by strengthening the unions’ rent-extracting power, they deter R&D investments and
reduce employment and output levels. An immediate policy implication is that a reduction of
unemployment beneﬁts is expected to increase cost-reducing R&D activities and thus enhance
social welfare.16
An important question that arises in our setup is whether a regulator should encourage
the formation of an RJV or not. From (35) and (37), it can be checked that SWD
c >S W D
nc
if and only if δ>δ D =0 .286; also, from (36) and (38), we have SWC
c >S W C
nc if and only
if δ>δ C =0 .714. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. Although ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
always higher under an RJV rather than under non-cooperative investments, unions’ rents and
consumer surplus are higher but only if δ>δ D (δ>δ C) under a decentralized (centralized)
wage-setting regime. This is due to the fact that R&D investments, wages, and employment
and output levels are then higher under an RJV rather than under non-cooperative R&D
investments. The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 5 Under ﬁrm-level unions, the regulator should encourage the formation of an
RJV as long as the spillover rate is not too low (for all δ>δ D =0 .286). In contrast, under an
14In a non-unionized industry social welfare is the sum of consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Using the rele-






















15Haucap and Wey (2004) also suggest that the formation of industry-wide unions should not be allowed due
to their monopolization eﬀects.
16This is in line with Nickell et al., (2003) suggesting that “Among the wide range of policies and institu-
tions that have the potential to shift the wage curve upwards and generate high unemployment are collective
bargaining arrangements that lead to high wage settlements and minimum wages that are high relative to the
average wage”.
27industry-wide union, the formation of an RJV should be encouraged only if the spillover rate
is high enough (only if δ>δ C =0 .714).
Note further that in the absence of unions, the formation of an RJV should be encouraged
only if δ>δ nU =0 .5.17 A number of observations are in order. First, the range of spillover
parameters for which the regulator should encourage the formation of an RJV is much wider
under ﬁrm-level unions than under an industry-wide union, with the non-union case lying in
between. Thus, the unionization structure of an industry may aﬀect the regulator’s decision to
encourage the formation of an RJV in that industry. Second, the social and market incentives
for the formation of an RJV are not always aligned. Indeed, they diverge signiﬁcantly in the
centralized wage-setting regime, since although ﬁrms have always incentives to form an RJV
when its formation is costless, this is socially desirable only if spillovers are quite pronounced
(δ>0.714). In contrast, under decentralized wage-setting, the social and market incentives
quite often coincide (with the exception in case that spillovers are rather low, δ<0.286).
Interestingly, the extent of alignment between social and market incentives for the formation
of an RJV is not monotone in the degree of unionization. In particular, as we move from a
non-unionized industry to a decentralized and then to a centralized wage-setting industry, the
alignment of incentives initially increases and then decreases. Third, the design of technology
and other policies for the encouragement/deterrence of RJVs should make a careful account of
all the characteristics of the industry under consideration, and in particular whether ﬁrms face
a competitive labor market or their employees belong to ﬁrm-level unions or to an industry-
wide union. Our analysis thus reinforces the argument according to which, labor market
policies should be designed in coordination with other policies aﬀecting wages, i.e., technology
policy. This is in line with the recent OECD conclusions that “Interactions between collective
bargaining and other policies aﬀecting wages receive only cursory attention” (OECD, 2004, p.
128).




nc if and only if δ>δ nU =0 .5 (see footnote above).
287E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we consider a number of modiﬁcations of the basic model in order to discuss
the robustness of our main results.
7.1 Bertrand Competition
I nt h eb a s i cm o d e lw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tﬁrms produce homogenous goods and compete in
quantities. Consider now the case where the ﬁrms sell diﬀerentiated goods and compete in
prices. Each ﬁrm i faces a standard linear demand, qi =[ a(1 − γ) −pi +γpj]/(1 −γ2),w h e r e
γ, 0 ≤ γ<1, is the degree of product substitutability, with γ =0(γ =1 ) corresponding
to the case of independent (homogenous) goods. Keeping all other modeling speciﬁcations
ﬁxed, we reconﬁrm for the Bertrand competition case all our main results.18 In particular,
we show that ﬁrms have always incentives to form an RJV, independently of the unionization
s t r u c t u r ea sl o n ga st h eR J Vf o r m a t i o ni sc o s t l e ss. Further, that there exist critical values
of the spillover rate δD(γ) and δC(γ), respectively for the decentralized and the centralized
unionization structure, such that for all δ>δ r(γ), r = D, C, ﬁrms’ R&D investments, wages,
employment and output levels and social welfare are higher under an RJV than under non-
cooperative R&D investments. It also holds that δD(γ) <δ C(γ) for all γ,a n dt h a tδD(γ) and
δC(γ) are increasing in the degree of product substitutability (with δD(0) = 0 <δ C(0) = 0.333
and limγ→1 δD(1) = limγ→1 δC(1) = 1). The intuition for the latter result is as follows. The
more homogeneous the goods are, the ﬁercer is the competition between ﬁrms, and the larger
should thus be the internalized spillovers under an RJV in order R&D investments, wages,
employment and output levels and social welfare to be higher under an RJV than under non-
cooperative R&D investments. Finally, the intuitive arguments in the Bertrand case are in line
with the respective ones in the Cournot case.
7.2 Right-to-Manage
In the basic model we have assumed that unions have all the power to set wages. In reality
however, unions and ﬁrms often negotiate over their wages, before ﬁrms choose their employ-
18The detailed analysis for the Bertrand case is available from the authors upon request.
29ment and output levels (Right-to-Manage model). It is then natural to ask whether our main
results still hold when ﬁrms have bargaining power in the wage determination stage. Let β and
(1 − β), 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, be respectively the bargaining power of the union(s) and the ﬁrms during
the wage determination stage. That is, both ﬁrms have equal bargaining power; moreover, the
industry-wide union’s power in the centralized negotiations case is equal to a ﬁrm-level union’s
power under decentralized wage negotiations. To solve for the equilibrium wage rates, we em-
ploy the Nash equilibrium between two simultaneous ﬁrm-union generalized Nash Bargaining
games under ﬁrm-level unions. While under an industry-wide union, the negotiated wage is
the solution to the generalized Nash Bargaining game where the central union negotiates with
the ﬁrms’ federation (whose objective is to maximize the overall industry’s proﬁts) over the
uniform wage rate.19
I nt h eR i g h t - t o - M a n a g em o d e lw eh a v er e c o n ﬁrmed our main results.20 In particular, we
show that again ﬁrms have always incentives to form an RJV, independently whether wage-
negotiations are centralized or decentralized, provided that the formation of the RJV is costless.
Secondly, that there exist critical values of the spillover rate δD(β) and δC(β), respectively for
the decentralized and the centralized wage negotiations case, such that for all δ>δ r(β),
r = D,C, ﬁrms’ R&D investments, wages, employment and output levels and social welfare
are higher under an RJV than under non-cooperative R&D investments. Thirdly, we ﬁnd
that δD(β) <δ C(β) for all β, and that δD(β) is decreasing, while δC(β) is increasing, in the
union(s) power. Intuitively, beginning from the benchmark case where wages are exogenous
(δ =0 .5), the critical spillover rate decreases (increases), as we move towards the polar case of
two monopoly ﬁrm level unions (one monopoly industry-wide union). Finally, and as expected,
δD(1) = 0.286 <δ C(1) = 0.714,a n dδD(0) = 0.5=δC(0).
An immediate consequence of the above is that it is the institutional level of wage de-
termination (centralized vs. decentralized), and not the distribution of power between ﬁrms
and unions, that drives our main results. This is a novel ﬁnding, because the existing liter-
ature does not consider R&D incentives under wage negotiations in alternative unionization
19Disagreement payoﬀs are assumed to be zero and w0 for ﬁrms and union(s), respectively.
20T h ec a s eo fﬁrm-level negotiations over wages was analytically solved, while results for the case of bargaining
between a central union and the ﬁrms’ federation were obtained with numerical simulations. Detailed analysis
is available from the authors upon request.
30structures (see footnote 20).
7.3 Coordinated Union
So far we have assumed that under centralized wage-setting, the industry-wide union sets a
uniform wage rate for both ﬁrms. Following Hawcap and Wey (2004), we consider now the case
where the industry-wide union makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀers to the ﬁrms in
order to maximize overall union’s rents, U (wi,w j,L i,L j)=( wi − w0)Li(.)+( wj − w0)Lj(.).
This is known in the literature as the Coordinated (Co) unionization structure.
Considering ﬁrst the case in which ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively in R&D, we solve the four-
stage game and compare its equilibrium outcome with those obtained under the decentralized
and the centralized wage-setting regimes.21 The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 6 An individual ﬁrm’s R&D investments, as well as employment and output
levels, are lower under the coordinated than under both the decentralized and the centralized
wage-setting regimes. Equilibrium wage rates, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and social welfare under the coor-
dinated regime lie in between the decentralized and the centralized regime.
Interestingly, and in contrast to the conventional hold-up argument, R&D investments
under the coordinated regime are lower than equilibrium investments under the centralized
regime. This is so because the wage-level hold-up is more severe under an industry-wide union
that coordinates its wage demands than under a union that sets a uniform wage rate. In
addition, in contrast to the centralized wage-setting regime where the wage-diﬀerentiation
hold-up is absent, wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up is present under coordinated wage-setting.
Turning next to the case where ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively in R&D, it can
be shown that the coordinated wage-setting regime leads to the same equilibrium outcomes as
the centralized one. This is due to the linearity of the ﬁrms’ labor demand functions, which are
also symmetric as long as the two ﬁrms’ R&D investments are equal under the RJV. In this case
a wage discriminating industry-wide union will set the same wage rate for both ﬁrms, which
will be equal to the uniform wage rate that would have been set by a (non-discriminating)
21See Appendix for the analysis of the coordinated union case. Further details are available from the authors
upon request.
31industry-wide union. Anticipating this, ﬁrms that form an RJV and avoid thus free-riding
have the same incentives to spend on R&D independently whether an industry-wide union sets
a uniform wage rate or two ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates. We further ﬁnd that R&D investments,
wages, employment and output levels are higher under an RJV than under non-cooperative
R&D spending if and only if δ>δ Co ≡ 0.5,w i t hδD <δ Co = δnU <δ C. Surprisingly enough,
the critical spillover rate under the coordinated case coincides with that under a non-unionized
industry.
Finally, deﬁning MCo = πCo
c − πCo
nc as an individual ﬁrm’s incentive to participate in an
RJV under a coordinated wage-setting regime, and comparing ﬁrms’ incentives to form an
RJV under the three alternative unionization structures, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7 (i) Firms have stronger incentives to form an RJV under coordinated than
under decentralized wage-setting whenever δ<0.379; otherwise, they have weaker incentives.
(ii) Firms have stronger incentives to form an RJV under coordinated than under central-
ized wage-setting whenever δ<0.638; otherwise, they have weaker incentives.
The intuitive arguments go along the lines of the analysis that compares the magnitude
of an individual ﬁrm’s incentives to participate in an RJV under ﬁrm-level unions and an
industry-wide union.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have investigated the eﬀects of alternative unionization structures on ﬁrms’
R&D investments, employment and output levels, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and welfare, by incorporating
R&D spillovers and allowing ﬁrms to form Research Joint Ventures. In our setup, we have
identiﬁed various circumstances under which a reversal of the “hold-up” argument is observed.
In particular, union centralization is shown to create stronger R&D incentives than a decentral-
ized unionization structure for all market sizes whenever spillovers are low enough. We have
also shown that the magnitude of the ﬁrms’ incentives to form an RJV is non-monotone in the
spillover rate, independently whether ﬁrms are unionized or not, as well as independently of
the mode of unionization. In fact, the formation of an RJV is more attractive for ﬁrms when
spillovers are absent or when they are full, but this depends on the particular unionization
32structure in the industry. As a consequence, the ﬁrms’ beneﬁts from an RJV depend crucially
on both the severity of the spillovers and the mode of unionization. Therefore, the ﬁrms’
incentives to form a costly RJV could diﬀer substantially across industries. Finally, market
and social incentives for the formation of an RJV often diverge, and in particular they are
hardly aligned in the case of a centralized unionization structure. Our ﬁndings further suggest
that policy measures that are intended to encourage RJVs should be carefully designed, taking
into account all the features of the industry, namely its unionization structure, the severity of
spillovers etc.
Our results could also provide some guidelines for future empirical research on the “R&D
investments in unionized industries” literature which, as mentioned above, is so far inconclu-
sive as regards the role of unions for ﬁrms’ innovation activities. Empirical analyses should
begin with a detailed study classifying industries according to their unionization structure,
the severity of the spillovers as well as the organizational mode of R&D activities. A number
of testable hypotheses emerges from our analysis. For instance, in industries with low R&D
spillovers and non-cooperative R&D spending, a testable hypothesis is that R&D investments
under an industry-wide union are larger than the respective ones under ﬁrm-level unions. A
second testable hypothesis is that the probability of ﬁrms to participate in an RJV depends
on the level at which wages are set for industries with similar spillover rates. A third testable
hypothesis is that in industries with low spillovers, the probability of ﬁrms’ participation in
RJVs is higher under centralized than under decentralized unionization; and vice versa for high
spillovers.
In our analysis we have assumed that spillovers are exogenously given. There is however
a recent line of research where spillovers are treated as endogenous, that is, ﬁrms optimally
choose the extent to which their technological achievements will spill over to their rivals (see
e.g. Poyago-Theotoky, 1999; Gil-Moltó et al., 2005; Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005). An
interesting direction for further research would be to endogenize spillovers for both the cases of
non-cooperative R&D spending and an RJV and investigate the role of alternative unionization
structures for the ﬁrms’ incentives to spend on R&D as well as to form RJVs.
339A p p e n d i x
The Coordinated Union case: We ﬁrst consider non-cooperative R&D investments. Output
and employment levels are then given by (8). In the third stage, the industry-wide union








(wi − w0)[(a − c) − 2wi + wj + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (39)
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As expected, wi increases with the workers’ outside option w0, as well as with the ﬁrm i’s




2, independent of the
spillover rate δ. Note also that wi increases with the rival ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort xj. Moreover, one
can check from (40) that ∆w = wi − wj = 1−δ
2 (xi − xj).T h i sr e ﬂects the wage-diﬀerentiation
hold-up, with ∂∆wCo
∂xi = 1−δ
2 ; i.e. it becomes less pronounced as δ increases.
In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously invest in R&D, each maximizing its proﬁts, which






[a − c − w0 + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] − x2
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>From the ﬁrst order conditions of (41) and symmetry, the equilibrium R&D investment is:
xCo
nc =
(2 − δ)(a − c − w0)
34 − δ + δ2 (42)
Using (42), we get respectively each ﬁrm’s equilibrium wage rate, employment level, and
proﬁts:
wCo
nc = w0 +
18(a − c)
34 − δ + δ2 (43)
LCo
nc =
6(a − c − w0)
34 − δ + δ2 (44)
34πCo
nc =
(32 + 4δ − δ2)(a − c − w0)
2
¡
34 − δ + δ2¢2 (45)
Interestingly, when an industry-wide union coordinates its wage demands w1 and w2,t h e
relation between the eﬀective R&D investment eCo
nc =( 1+δ)xCo
nc and the spillover rate is an
inverted U-shaped, with its maximum attained at δ =0 .5. The intuition behind this result
goes along the lines of the centralized wage-setting case. It can also be shown that the rate
of reduction of an individual ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort as the spillover rate δ increases lies in between
the respective rates under the centralized and the decentralized regime, i.e. | ∂xD
nc/∂δ |<|
∂xCo
nc /∂δ |<| ∂xC
nc/∂δ |. The equilibrium wage rates, the overall cost reduction (eCo
nc − wCo
nc ),
and the employment and output levels follow the same pattern as the eﬀective R&D investment
level. Nevertheless, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are always increasing in the spillover rate δ.
On the other hand, when ﬁrms form an RJV and invest cooperatively, it turns out that
the equilibrium outcome is the same independently whether the industry-wide union sets a
uniform wage rate w or it coordinates its wage demands w1 and w2 (and is given by Eqns.
(30) - (33)). In fact, the industry-wide union’s wage demand for each ﬁrm is equal to the
equilibrium uniform wage rate under the centralized wage-setting regime. As a result, ﬁrms
have the same incentives to invest in R&D in the coordinated and the centralized wage-setting
regime.
Finally, one can easily check that in the coordinated wage-setting regime, equilibrium R&D
investments, wage rates, and employment and output levels are higher under an RJV than
under non-cooperative R&D spending if and only if δ>δ Co ≡ 0.5. ¥
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